Everyone seems to have advice for the
Trump administration on Russia policy these
days. Some recommend what is essentially a deal with
Putin (arguing that Russia does not pose an immediate threat to the United
States and can be a partner in some conflict areas), while others recommend a more hardline strategy (contending that Russia
tried to undermine U.S. and that the at
the war in Ukraine is far from over).
It may take some time before the White House will be
able to formulate its views. My advice? Hit pause, because acting now only
plays into Putin’s hands.
PROBLEMS OF PUTIN’S OWN MAKING
Russia is in an early pre-election season itself, with
Putin up for re-election (assuming he runs, which is a safe assumption) in
March 2018. The outcome is easy to guess, and Putin and the Kremlin are
approaching the vote as a personal referendum, of sorts. The Kremlin wants no
fewer than 50 percent of all Russian voters to cast a ballot for Putin, which
means regional authorities have been instructed to ensure a 70 percent turnout
and, of those, 70 percent for Putin. Putin will likely run on a Trumpian campaign
message—Make Russia Great Again!—but is unlikely to dramatically turn big
policy wheels.
In this environment, either of the main U.S. options
would benefit Putin. If Russia hawks in Washington win out, Putin will tell
voters that he made Russia stronger and the United States only wants to
undermine it. If Russia doves in Washington win out, he’ll claim to have
brought the United States to its knees. In either case, Putin consolidates
support.
What Washington must do instead is force Putin to face
the real challenges that he himself created. While the Russian economy grew an
average of 7 percent per year in the first eight years of Putin’s presidency,
it is now in a sluggish mode, with very low growth during the last eight years.
Growth perspectives are currently at around about 1 percent. In 2016, Russian
GDP was only 2.7 percent larger than in 2008, and private consumption fell by
15 percent in the last two years.
Figure. Russian GDP, 2000-2016 (100 = 2000)
The origins of the economic crisis are evident: Growth
started to decline in 2013, when the price of oil was well above $100 per
barrel (and no one was talking about sanctions). But poor rule of law
protections drove poor property rights protections, which led to a decline in
investments. Meanwhile, the Kremlin has done little to nothing to improve the
situation. In contrast, Russian leaders made their economic situation worse by
annexing Crimea three years ago, requiring a massive drainage of resources from
the Russian economy. The decision to sponsor a military conflict in eastern
Ukraine further added to the burden.
THE JUDO APPROACH
Putin’s favorite sport is judo, and he participates in
international affairs much like a judo athlete.
It’s a very opportunistic sport, with a lot of time
spent resisting and neutralizing the opponent using the most efficient methods
possible, waiting for the right moment to strike. When Obama announced, but
didn’t follow through on, his “red line” on Syria in 2013, for example, Putin
took the opportunity to strengthen Russia’s positions in Syria and eventually
joined the conflict outright. In 2014, sensing another moment, he grabbed
Crimea. Putin is always looking for any gifts Washington might give him.
Another important fact about judo is that some
competitions are open-weight, meaning competitors go head-to-head in spite of
being different weights. Russia is in many ways smaller than the United States:
its GDP and military budget—even in purchasing power parity terms—are only 20
percent of America’s. And yet, Russia regularly demands to be treated as an
equal. In judo, this approach can be quite effective: rather than resist your
opponent on the basis of strength (which will result in your defeat), adjust to
your opponent and find ways to use his larger weight to tip his balance. That
is Putin’s approach to the United States: he tries to destabilize his opponent
in order to improve his leverage for the eventual deal-making phase.
Finally, judo is fundamentally a tactical sport. In
his approach to international relations, Putin concentrates on a precise target
and narrows his efforts accordingly, economizing his forces. He waits for
moments when the small application of pressure or force can yield a big effect.
PATIENCE IS A VIRTUE
Given that Putin has a number of troubles of his own
making, and that his judo-esque strategy in world affairs relies heavily on
patience, Washington should be patient: letting Putin act, but not reacting.
That is the main winning strategy for the heavier-weight fighter in judo—not to
run hotfoot for immediate victory, but rather to make the opponent to feel the
discomfort of his situation and exhaust himself through strain. Rather than
come out with statements and actions now, let Putin face his challenges and let
the Russian people recognize the price of those challenges.
So, any near-term action or statement from Washington
on Russia policy will benefit Putin. An offer from Trump to Putin resembling a
deal will enhance the latter’s dominance in former Soviet space, while tough
moves from the White House would help Putin mask his own problems (and he’d
likely ramp up his hybrid warfare campaign, placing additional missiles in
Kaliningrad or Crimea, or buzzing U.S. ships and planes). With Putin looking
ahead to March 2018, maintaining his domestic popularity is at the forefront of
his mind. And there is no better way to boost popularity before what is
essentially a referendum than to demonstrate a “wag the dog”-style victory over
the United States on Russian TV screens. Washington should refrain, in any way
it can, from helping Putin. It should demonstrate to Russia—through its
behavior, not by making explicit statements to this effect—that Russia is not a
top foreign policy priority, and that Washington won’t give Putin the chance to
win in an open-weight contest.
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